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Abstract 
Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic 
management. This paper addresses micro-foundations in two related ways. First, we 
argue that the kind of macro (or “collectivist”) explanation that is utilized in the 
capabilities view in strategic management ⎯ which implies a neglect of micro-
foundations ⎯ is incomplete. There are no mechanisms that work solely on the 
macro-level, directly connecting routines through capabilities to firm-level 
outcomes. While routines and capabilities are useful shorthand for complicated 
patterns of individual action and interaction, ultimately they are best understood at 
the micro-level. Second, we provide a formal model that shows precisely why 
macro explanation is incomplete and which exemplifies how explicit micro-
foundations may be built for notions of routines and capabilities and for how these 
impact firm performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic management. 
Scholars increasingly realize that understanding such issues as value appropriation (Coff, 
1999; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a; Barney, 2001), resource value (Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003b; Foss and Foss, 2005), strategy implementation (Barney, 2001), factor market dynamics 
(Makadok and Barney, 2001), and firm-level heterogeneity (Felin and Hesterly, 2006; Gavetti, 
2005) requires that substantial attention be paid to explanatory mechanisms that are located at 
the “micro-level,” that is, the level of individual action and (strategic) interaction. It seems that 
strategic management is now embarking on a micro-foundations project somewhat similar to, 
and perhaps inspired by, economics and rational choice sociology (Elster, 1989; Coleman, 
1990; Abell, 2003a&b).   
This paper contributes to the emerging micro-foundations project theoretically and 
methodologically. Specifically, we address the recent emphasis placed upon routines and 
capabilities as key constructs in strategic management research. A central argument of this 
literature is that routines or capabilities are fundamental units of analysis, and that 
organizations should be conceptualized as repositories of routines and capabilities (e.g., 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992). It is, furthermore, asserted in this stream 
of research that routines and capabilities cause firm-level outcomes such as financial 
performance, innovation, and the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Winter, 2003). Thus, it is argued that explaining firm-level outcomes should take place in 
terms of other firm-level variables.  
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Two explanatory gaps ⎯ of which we shall primarily concentrate on the second one ⎯ stand 
out in this research stream. First, there is little recognition of the need to explain the origins (or 
emergence) of routines and capabilities (except perhaps in terms of other routines and 
capabilities). Second, exactly how routines and capabilities are related to firm-level outcomes, 
such as performance, is seldom elaborated (cf. Argote and Ingram, 2000: 156). Thus, crucial 
explanatory theoretical mechanisms are left unexplored and implicit.   
We argue that gaps related to underlying micro-foundations cannot be bypassed, they need to 
be explicated, and that in addressing these gaps one must involve the level of individual action 
and interaction. This reasoning is based on the argument that the macro (or “collectivist”) 
mode of explanation that currently dominates large parts of the strategic management 
literature, and which asserts a causal relation running from routines and capabilities to firm-
level outcomes, is incomplete. To be sure, firm-level concepts such as routines and capabilities 
may be relevant to the explanation of firm-level outcomes. However, they are relevant because 
they (as well as the postulated connections from them to firm-level outcomes) are useful 
shorthand for complicated repetitive patterns of individual action and coordinated interaction. 
Thus, the micro-level (i.e., individual action and interaction) ultimately replaces the macro-
level (i.e., the postulated direct link between routines/capabilities and performance) in the 
explanation of how routines/capabilities and performance are linked.  
To clarify this argument, we develop a formal model that details the importance of the micro-
level in explaining firm-level outcomes. The arguments, and the accompanying modelling 
effort, further the ongoing micro-foundations project in strategic management by explaining 
how micro-foundations can be built for routines and capabilities and how they are linked to 
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firm-level outcomes. Overall, our critique and modelling effort of routines and capabilities is 
essentially a friendly one, and one that is offered as a contribution to furthering the received 
capabilities view in strategic management (cf. Zollo and Winter, 2001).  
Specifically, we argue that, fundamentally, the nature of routines is to internalize externalities. 
This argument harmonizes with the emphasis in the literature on routines as coordinating 
devices (Nelson and Winter, 1982: Chapter 5). However, because of asymmetric information 
routines only imperfectly internalize externalities. This second-best argument harmonizes with 
the emphasis in the literature which suggests that routines are often not optimal (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). However, we diverge from the literature first, by explicitly modelling the 
micro-foundations of routines; second, by embedding our arguments in a conventional 
production function framework; and third, by modelling production externalities as giving rise 
to prisoners’ dilemma situations rather than to coordination problems. Finally, we link routines 
and capabilities in a simple manner by arguing that a firm can be described as possessing the 
capability to realise a routine to the degree that it can repeatedly internalise such externalities.  
ANALYTICAL LEVELS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
Many phenomena of interest in the strategic management field, such as financial performance, 
diversification patterns, vertical integration, competitive rivalry, etc., are placed on a level of 
analysis that is above that of the individual. In fact, explananda (i.e., the dependent variables) 
in strategic management are usually placed at the level of the firm. However, the explanans 
(i.e., the independent variables and the mechanisms that link them to the dependent variables) 
may involve other levels of analysis as well, such as the dyadic level, the industry level, or the 
level of individuals. Any theoretical and empirical effort to explain phenomena in strategic 
 5
management has to make a choice that concerns the level(s) at which explanation takes place 
(Dansereau et al., 1999). A classic distinction in social science research is between the 
collective and the individual level (Coleman, 1990: 3-5; Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1970), which 
in the context of organizational theory and strategic management corresponds to a distinction 
between “macro” and “micro.” We argue that strategic management research has too often 
located not only the explanandum (which is entirely legitimate) on the collective or macro 
level, but also all of the explanans (which is highly problematic).  
A General Model of Social Science Explanation 
In order to clarify notions of “micro”/“individual level,” and “macro”/“collective level, as well 
as examine the relations between these notions and levels, consider Figure 1 which builds on 
the framework popularized by James Coleman (1990). This framework organizes much of our 
discussion and modelling effort.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The figure makes a distinction between the macro-level and the micro-level. For example, it 
may be that the macro-level is organizational whilst the micro-level is that of individuals. As 
shown, there are links between macro-macro (arrow 4) and macro-micro (arrow 1), micro-
micro (arrow 2), and micro-macro (arrow 3).1 The figure also makes a distinction, perhaps 
more implicit, between what is to be explained (i.e., the explanandum) and its explanation 
                                                          
1 Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 296-8) refer to arrow 1, 2 and 3 as “situational,” “individual action,” and 
“transformational” mechanisms, respectively. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004: Section 7) calls arrow “downwards 
causation.”  
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(i.e., the explanans). In social science, the aim usually is to explain either a macro-level 
phenomenon (located in the upper right hand corner of figure 1), such as a firm-level outcome, 
or a link between macro-phenomena, as indicated by arrow 4. An example of the latter may be 
an observed correlation between the routines and the performance of firms in a population.   
To explain and understand a particular phenomenon (such as overall firm performance) the 
analyst makes use of theoretical mechanisms that are consistent with the arrows. Note that the 
arrows in Figure 1 are, from a theoretical perspective, empty boxes. They may be filled with 
different theoretical mechanisms, entirely dependent on theory development on the part of the 
analyst. (Our later modelling effort is an example of development of such concrete theoretical 
content). For example, consider using the Coleman framework to analyze the effects of 
corporate culture on firm performance (e.g., Schein, 1982; Barney, 1986), whilst providing 
micro-foundations for this link. Corporate culture is then the macro phenomenon placed in the 
upper left hand corner of figure 1, while firm performance is the macro outcome placed at the 
upper right hand corner. An attempt to explain, say, an observed close correlation between 
certain characteristics of corporate culture and firm performance should, from a micro-
foundations perspective, involve arrows 1, 2 and 3.  
However, many different explanatory accounts can be constructed. For example, in one such 
account, corporate culture can have the function of credibly signalling to employees that if 
they invest in firm-specific human capital, they will be not be held up by management (cf. 
Kreps, 1990). This signal influences the incentives of employees to actually accumulate firm-
specific human capital (arrow 1). The result is that individual employees will actually 
undertake more such investments (arrow 2). The combined effect of each individual’s 
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investment in human capital is that firm-level performance increases (arrow 3). In an 
alternative account, corporate culture functions, not as an incentive device, but as a purely 
informational device that may improve the coordination of the actions of employees, leading 
to high firm-level productivity and possibly high financial performance (Cremer, 1994). And 
in a third kind of account, corporate culture imparts meaning to a firm’s labour-management 
institutions which may also impact employee productivity and firm-specific investments, again 
leading to high firm-level productivity and performance (Rowlinson, 1993). Other accounts 
may be constructed. However, these brief examples hopefully suffice to illustrate that rather 
different explanatory accounts placed on the micro-level may all explain an observed 
correlation on the macro-level (and that the explanatory account is influenced by the 
conceptualization of the macro-entity (or variable) that is part of the account).2  
Macro Explanation in Strategic Management  
At first inspection, the framework depicted in Figure 1 would seem to formally allow for 
explanation that takes place solely in terms of arrow 4, that is, explanatory accounts that are 
wholly located on the macro level. However, whether arrow 4 explanation is deemed 
legitimate depends on (ontological) criteria related to an understanding of how the social 
world works (Mäki, 2001). Specifically, there are no conceivable causal mechanisms in the 
social world that operate solely on the macro level. There are no macro-level entities on the 
social domain that somehow possess capacities or dispositions to act (Cartwright, 1989) that 
make them capable of directly producing macro-level outcomes and there are no processes of 
interaction between macro-entities that take place on this level. In short, there is no macro 
                                                          
2 They also suggest that while the micro-foundations project in economics and sociology has typically been 
associated with a rational choice approach, there is no necessary connection between building micro-foundations 
for macro-phenomena and the choice of such an approach.   
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level causal mechanism that can be theoretically represented in terms of arrow 4.3  
However, arrow 4 explanation is not necessarily entirely ruled out. First, arrow 4 may be taken 
as no more than a representation of a correlation between macro variables in need of further 
explanation of the micro-level. This is entirely unproblematic. Second, arrow 4 may be used as 
convenient shorthand. “Convenient shorthand” here means that we can make use of arrow 4 
explanations when we are convinced that they can be reduced to micro-mechanisms, but 
performing this reduction would not add anything in the explanatory context (cf. Stinchcombe, 
1991). For example, there is no problem in asserting and showing that organizational culture 
perhaps is correlated with organizational performance. More generally, arrow 4 explanation 
may be legitimate when the relationship does not appear to be particularly puzzling, for 
example, because we have a good grasp of the underlying micro-mechanism (Abell, 2003b: 
261). Moreover, it can be argued that for pragmatic reasons it is often times justified to do 
research as if arrow 4 causation existed. Thus, Stinchcombe (1991: 379-380) argues that 
“[w]here there is rich information on variations at the collective or structural level, while 
individual-level reasoning (a) has no substantial independent empirical support and (b) adds no 
new predictions at the structural level that can be independently verified, theorizing at the 
level of [individual level] mechanisms is a waste of time.” 
Be that as it may, it certainly is the case that several examples of arrow 4 “explanation” can be 
found, such as the arguments that routines are a direct cause of firm-level adaptation (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982), “combinative capabilities” cause firm-level innovativeness (Kogut and 
                                                          
3 Note that this point does not concern whether the explanandum can be placed on the macro level. Many (most) 
explananda in social science are placed at this level (Coleman, 1990: 2) ⎯ notably, most of the phenomena that 
strategic management seeks to explain.  
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Zander, 1992), and different “absorptive capacities” cause differences in how well firms learn 
from partner firms in inter-organizational relations (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  
It was briefly suggested above that macro explanation may be warranted under certain 
conditions. However, it would be hard to argue that these conditions are always met in 
strategic management research; in fact, it is rarely so. Thus, strategic management scholars do 
not have theories of why routines and capabilities impact firm performance that involve the 
micro-level, that is, at the level of individual action and interaction. Second, there is much 
reason to think that micro-level considerations add substantially to macro-level understanding. 
For example, a micro perspective suggests that macro-level heterogeneity can be an 
epiphenomenon of individual level self-selection. Further reasons why micro-foundations are 
in fact critical are given in the following.  
Why Micro-Foundations Are Critical  
We take the position ⎯ associated with “methodological individualism” ⎯ that the 
explanation of firm-level (macro) phenomena in strategic management must ultimately be 
grounded in explanatory mechanisms that involve individual action and interaction (cf. Hayek, 
1952; Ullman-Margalitt, 1978; Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Boudon, 1998). We also take it 
that the ultimate aim of scientific endeavour in the field of strategic management should be to 
identify and theorize the causal mechanisms ⎯ the “cogs and wheels” (Elster, 1989: 3) ⎯ that 
produce the observed associations between events (Cowan and Rizzo, 1996; Hedstrom and 
Swedberg, 1998).4  
                                                          
4 For an elaboration of mechanism-based explanation for a management audience, see Felin and Foss (2006). 
There is a huge literature in the theory of science on the nature and role of mechanisms in explanation. The 
interested reader may consult Cartwright (1989), Bunge (1997), Glennan (1996), and Machamer, Darden and 
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Combining methodological individualism with an emphasis on causal mechanisms implies 
that strategic management should fundamentally be concerned about how intentional human 
action and interaction causally produce strategic phenomena. It is implicit in this view that 
explanatory black boxes be avoided (Boudon, 1998). Admittedly, black boxes may sometimes 
be justified in terms of explanatory parsimony (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998:12; also see 
Coleman, 1990: 16), as indeed happens in much of arrow 4-type explanation. Strategic 
management scholars know (or should know) that when they speak of a firm appropriating a 
revenue stream, this is shorthand for a complicated underlying process of bargaining between 
numerous individual resource-owners and other stakeholders (Coff, 1999; Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003). In a related vein, to say that a firm has a certain capability is essentially 
shorthand for a complex set of underlying individual actions and interactions, and associated 
characteristics or skills which make the realization of these capabilities possible.  Because 
scholars may not always want to make explicit reference to complicated underlying patterns of 
actions, they often prefer to make use of explanatory shorthand in the form of collective 
concepts. This is completely legitimate. However, a fundamental methodological (and 
ultimately theoretical and managerial) problem in contemporary strategic management 
research is that it seems to be too often forgotten that explanation in strategic management 
should nevertheless have a micro-foundation.   
Before proceeding to our modelling effort, we delineate, building on Coleman’s (1990: 3-4) 
insight, three reasons why micro-foundations are critical for strategic management. The three 
reasons are: “alternative explanations,” “managerial intervention, and “fundamental causes 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Craver (2000). 
 11
and predictability” (cf. Coleman, 1990: 3-4). 
Alternative explanations. A problem with macro-level explanation is that there are likely to be 
many alternative lower-level explanations of macro-level behaviour which cannot be rejected 
with macro-analysis alone. Even if a large sample can be constructed on the basis of macro 
units of analysis, a problem of alternative explanations may persist. As indicated above, 
alternative explanations at lower levels are readily apparent in, notably, the capabilities view, 
which seeks the explanation of differential firm performance in firm-level heterogeneity, that 
is, heterogeneous routines and capabilities. However, heterogeneity may be located at the 
individual level, notably when individuals self-select into particular firms.5  
Managerial intervention. An argument for the importance of understanding micro-
foundations lies in the fundamental mandate of strategic management: to enable managers to 
gain and sustain competitive advantage. To achieve this, managerial intervention is required, 
which inevitably has to take place with an eye to the micro-level. For example, a correlation 
between collective culture and collective outcomes inherently tells the manager very little of 
what should be done to change culture.  Similarly, it makes little sense to argue that managers 
can directly intervene on the level of, for example, capabilities. Perhaps, however, managers 
can influence capabilities, for example, by hiring key employees (in which case the micro-
level is directly involved) or by changing overall recruitment policies, reward systems, etc., all 
of which involves the micro-level.  
Fundamental causes and prescription. We cannot, we contend, conceive of “capabilities” 
absent an understanding of the individual actions and interactions that produce a capability. 
                                                          
5 The capabilities literature has recently begun to note this, as scholars point to the capabilities themselves being 
rooted in specific individuals, rather than the organization (e.g., Lacetera et al., 2004; Song et al., 2003). 
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We may, again, in a shorthand manner think of capabilities at t resulting from capabilities at t-
1, but the above arguments indicate that such a macro-level explanation is rarely sufficiently 
fundamental.6 Coleman (1990: 3) convincingly argues that explanations that involve the micro 
level have the properties of being more stable, fundamental, and general than macro level 
explanations:   
An explanation based on internal analysis [i.e., micro-foundations] of system 
[organization] behaviour in terms of action and orientations of lower-level units is 
likely to be more stable and general than explanation which remains at the system 
level. Since the system’s behaviour is in fact resultant of the actions of its component 
parts, knowledge of how the actions of these parts combine to produce systematic 
behaviour can be expected to give greater predictability than will statistical relations 
of surface characteristics of the system. 
To the extent that strategic management is concerned not just with explaining past 
performance but also with being prescriptive, Coleman’s point raises an important concern: 
The ability to predict is a condition for putting forward prescriptions. Micro-foundations are 
therefore an important part of strategic management as a prescriptive enterprise.  
ROUTINES AND CAPABILITIES  
The seminal and in many ways founding contribution to the capabilities view is Nelson and 
Winter (1982). Their conceptualizations and insights have been fundamental to the way 
subsequent work on routines and capabilities has developed (Foss, 2003; Becker, 2004), not 
the least in strategic management (e.g., Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Dosi, Nelson and 
                                                          
6 For example, “sufficiency” may be defined in terms of whether an explanation is useful for the particular kinds 
of intervention for which it is intended (cf. Coleman, 1990: 5).  
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Winter, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).7 In this section we look at routines, first, as 
dependent variables (i.e., as explananda), and, second, as independent variables (i.e., part of 
the explanans). We argue in both cases the extant literature has a problem with missing micro-
foundations for routines.  
Explaining Routines  
Nelson and Winter begin their analysis of routines from the notion of skill (Nelson and Winter 
1982: chapter 4), which they define as “… a capability for a smooth sequence of coordinated 
behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its objectives, given the context in which it 
normally occurs” (1982: 73).8 There are a number of reasons why the skill metaphor is 
attractive to Nelson and Winter (see Foss, 2003), but the one that is of interest in the present 
context is that the notion of skills is used to establish a link between individual action and 
organizational routines, even if that link is merely metaphorical. Routines are conceptualized 
by Nelson and Winter (1982: 124) as the “skills of an organization” and as “a repetitive 
pattern of activity in an entire organization” (ibid.: 97). Routines refer to repetitive interaction 
that is somehow patterned, typically (but not necessarily) in the form of fixed sequences of 
                                                          
7 Note that there is a fundamental difference in terms of levels of analysis between Nelson and Winter (1982) and 
later writers in strategic management: Nelson and Winter were interested in building (evolutionary) theories that 
would be rival to the dominant neoclassical approach with respect to explaining and predicting outcomes at the 
level of the industry (i.e., evolutionary price theory) and the level of the economy (i.e., evolutionary growth 
theory). Routines and capabilities were parts of this analytical enterprise, but the aim was not to explain them per 
se. This also explains why in Nelson and Winter’s treatment, quite a lot is packed into the notion of organization 
routine, including a variety of behaviors (e.g., heuristics and strategies), organizational processes and 
arrangements, cognitive issues (e.g., “organizational memories”), and incentives (“truces”). The reason for this 
all-inclusiveness arguably is that “routine” is a catch-all concept for those collective-level aspects of an 
organization that may contribute to the relative rigidity of firm-level behavior that is so important in evolutionary 
theory. In contrast, strategic management is mainly interested in explaining and predicting competitive 
advantage, that is, a phenomenon that is placed on a level of analysis below that of the industry (or the economy), 
namely the level of the firm.   
8 In their discussion of routines, Cohen et al. (1996) echo this definition almost verbatim when they define a 
routine as “... an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has been learned by an 
organization in response to selective pressures” (Cohen et al., 1996: 683).   
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individual actions where the specific sequence and the contents thereof are organization-
specific (i.e., firm A may do things in a different order than firm B) (Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi 
et al., 1999; Becker, 2004).  
While Nelson and Winter spend considerable time on developing the notion of a routine, they 
are much less forthcoming about the notion of capability, which is loosely defined as 
“associated with” “individual members’ repertoires … particular collections of specialized 
plant and equipment … [and]… the ability to operate that plant and equipment” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982: 103). Unfortunately, they do not clarify how routines and capabilities are 
related, and much the same may be said of the subsequent literature that has taken its cues 
from Nelson and Winter.9 Because of this lack of clarity with respect to the capability 
construct, we shall primarily make reference to the less ambiguous routines construct, but later 
suggest a specific interpretation of what a capability may entail.   
Neither Nelson and Winter, nor subsequent writers in strategic management, have (to our 
knowledge) offered a rigorous analysis of why and how actions taken by different individuals 
in an organizational setting should come to mesh into orderly and repetitive (reproducible) 
sequences (employee A doing X after employee B has done Y, etc.), that is, routines. It is 
arguable that the reason for our understanding of routines being incomplete in this manner is 
the lack of an explicit starting point in individual action and interaction. Specifically, it is 
necessary to examine the actions that an individual can take (e.g., routine action or non-routine 
action) and the payoffs associated with these actions before it is possible to ascertain whether 
                                                          
9 It has been suggested, however, that there is a hierarchy in firms involving routines, capabilities and dynamic 
capabilities and that routines, representing, “static” sequences of actions, are somehow at the bottom of this 
hierarchy (e.g., Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).   
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the actions individually taken will constitute a routine.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Consider the left hand side of the the diagram depicted in figure 2, which is concerned with 
the explanation of routines (i.e., routines as explanandum). In terms of the diagram, arrows 1, 
2 and 3 are not given theoretical content in extant work on routines. Instead, routines at time t1 
are explained directly in terms of routines and capabilities at t0. For example, Nelson and 
Winter (1982) argue that routines change through the operation of other routines (“dynamic 
routines”). This is explanation in terms of arrow 4. A similar neglect of the micro level arises 
in connection with explanation that involves routines and capabilities, not as explananda, but 
as part of the explanans.  
Explaining by Means of Routines  
Among the reasons why routines have proved attractive to strategic management scholars is 
that they are seen as representing the outcomes at a given time of a firm’s knowledge 
development path (e.g., Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). They 
are therefore relevant to the understanding of such important knowledge-based phenomena as 
heterogeneity, competitive advantage, diversification patterns, and patterns of innovation. 
However, as Argote and Ingram (2000: 156) lamented, to the extent that there has been 
progress in studying knowledge as the foundation of competitive advantage, “… it has been at 
the level of identifying consistencies in organizations’ knowledge development paths and 
almost never at the level of human interactions that are the primary source of knowledge and 
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knowledge transfer.” In other words, explanations of (for example) competitive advantage that 
involve notions of routines in the explanans typically reason directly from these to competitive 
advantage. In terms of the right-hand side of Figure 2, this amounts to explanation using arrow 
4(a).  Again, however, arrows 1(a), 2(a) and 3(a) are not given theoretical content.  
Understanding the firm-level consequences of actions being routinized ⎯ for example, why a 
certain routine may be a source of superior performance ⎯ requires taking a starting point in 
individual action and interaction: The routine may be associated with a high-productivity 
equilibrium (Leibenstein, 1987), for example, because it leads to superior coordination of 
actions (Camerer and Knez, 1996) (sans incentive conflicts) or because it leads to agents 
choosing actions that overcome latent prisoners dilemma situations. Thus, the causal links 
from routines to firm-level outcomes are never direct (arrow 4a in Figure 1); rather, they 
involve individual skills, motivations, and actions. Unfortunately, these individual level 
considerations have been consistently blackboxed in the received capabilities view.10 The 
following section is an attempt to open up this black box.  
EXPLAINING THE LINKS BETWEEN ROUTINES,  
CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE 
Conceptualizing Routines and Capabilities 
As noted the relation between the core constructs of routines and capabilities is far from clear 
in the literature. Moreover, the definitions of capabilities are vague.  
We suggest the following simple definition of routines and capabilities and how they relate: A 
                                                          
10 For example, Nelson and Winter (1982: 107) assume that routines represent organizational truces. 
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firm can be described as possessing the capability to realise a routine to the degree that it can 
repeatedly internalise a pattern of individual level external productivity effects.11 
This definition seems to capture important parts of what many scholars ⎯ not only Nelson 
and Winter ⎯ imply by routines and capabilities (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963: 120-133).12 
Notably, there is more to a routine than merely sequentially organizing the productive effort of 
a number of independent productive agents. Their efforts are interdependent (as manifested in 
external productivity effects), and these interdependent efforts can be repeated (Cohen et al., 
1996). Also note the cross-level nature of this definition referring, as it does, to both a firm 
(collective level) and individuals.  
One might ask why the routine should not be attributed to the (collective action of) individuals 
rather than to the organisation (thus obviating the need for an awkward cross level 
conceptualization). The reason for taking this route is that the literature appears to make it a 
requirement of routines that they are replicable by mechanisms operating at the organisational 
level (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 117; Cohen et al., 1996).13 To put it somewhat differently, 
routines are deemed to be institutionalised to the extent that they are not overly sensitive to the 
turnover of employee and management turnover (and perhaps depreciation of substitutable 
capital assets) in realising the capability (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This feature must, of 
course, be a matter of degree and it is difficult to precisely characterise it.  
                                                          
11 It is possible to conceive of units of analysis (e.g., groups) lying between the firm and the individual, and, thus, 
group externalities, but we abstract from this complexity as group-level phenomena also invite reduction to the 
individual level. We use the term “productivity effect” to cover all possible functions. 
12 However, some scholars pack much more into these notions, see, e.g., Levitt and March (1988) for an 
extremely expansive definition of routines.  
13 Of course, this might be a surrogate for a management group. 
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Firms as Averaging Mechanisms 
The way we propose to address these issues is by conceiving a firm as an averaging 
mechanism. This notion may be exemplified in terms of a principal-agent setting with one 
principal and a number of agents that cooperate in a team (as in Alchian and Demsetz, 1982).  
Information is asymmetric in the specific sense that the principal cannot observe individual 
efforts and outputs. He can only observe the team’s output; however, basing the remuneration 
of individual team members on team output introduces a prisoners’ dilemma-problem. Resort 
to some kind of monitoring is therefore necessary. Although he cannot observe individual 
effort, the principal/manager can, based on various signals, form an estimate of the average of 
input productivities and therefore an estimate of output, given the average. Moreover, we 
assume that managers can implement this average and that the means to such implementation 
is a routine.   
The average mechanism conception implies that firms (i.e., management) do(es) not have the 
information to internalise the full micro complexity of external effects, which is why resort to 
some averaging procedure is necessary. This conception is consistent with the notion, central 
in large parts of the capabilities literature, that routines assist in coordinating dispersed, tacit 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi et al., 1999), that is, knowledge 
that cannot be fully centralized in the management team. Second, it is consistent with the 
notion that routines whilst conferring potentially high financial performance may not be 
optimal (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 126).14 Finally, it harmonizes with the key idea in the 
                                                          
14 A pertinent question is why a routine, if it is relatively easily replicable, is best coordinated in an organisation 
rather than by markets or by multilateral or distributed bilateral bargaining (Coase, 1937). The preliminary 
answer is that the efficiency losses introduced by averaging in organisation procedures are less than those 
associated with these alternative mechanisms.  We leave the exploration of this for treatment elsewhere. 
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literature that an important function of firms is to simplify the micro complexity of inter-
individual external productivity effects by means of routines and standard operating 
procedures (cf. Cyert and March, 1963).15   
Fundamental Notions 
The following modelling exercise gives some substance to the explanatory skeleton 
represented by the diagram in Figure 1. Specifically, Figure 3 which is simply an application 
of the Coleman diagram in Figure 1 to the present model, introduces some of the notation and 
terminology used here. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The basic analytical procedure is as follows. N individuals exerting certain skills at a certain 
level of motivation, X, could ⎯ in the absence of externalities in production ⎯ operate 
independently producing an aggregate output Yindep.. Under standard assumptions about 
production costs (which we shall leave implicit for the sake of clarity), there is in this case 
nothing to be gained from routinization.16 In order to provide a rationale for routines, we 
introduce production externalities as a network (i.e., a di-graph). Optimal output, Y*dep., now 
requires micro-level internalization of these effects. Consistent with the theory of the firm 
                                                          
15 One could go on to study productivity losses by introducing averaging under different assumptions about the 
distribution of these effects across the individuals/ positions in the routine. For instance, if they are distributed 
normally then averaging will not introduce  significant  distortions though if they were to follow a power 
distribution (which they may well if the structure of external effects contains hubs) then the average will not 
capture well the impact of the effects.   
16 We, thus, abstract from individual level learning. 
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literature (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982; Grossman and Hart, 1986) we 
assume that it is beyond the individuals, acting independently, to achieve such internalization. 
In this context, the firm may be seen as a mechanism for attending to the external effects when 
the output is Ydep. Because of asymmetrical information, not all external effects can be 
(efficiently) internalized; hence, the notion that only average external effects are internalized. 
The application of a routine results in an output level that lies somewhere in the interval, 
]Yindep., Y*dep.[.17 
In the following, routine impact on firm performance is thus defined as the explanandum (that 
is, we are taken up with the right-hand side of the diagram in figure 2). Routines are not 
necessarily independent of one another, as perhaps reflected in notions of routine hierarchies 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). The capability to realise one routine may depend 
upon the capacity to realise other routines (i.e., inter-routine synergies). For the sake of 
expository convenience, however, we abstract away from such interdependence and deal with 
an independent routine.  
Individual Level Considerations 
To introduce individual level considerations, let the productive output of individual i = (1, 
2,.….., N) in the routine be Yi . Further, let the exogenous individual (micro) level variable be 
X (i.e., the bottom node to the left in Fig. 2). To ease presentation, Xi represents an interactive 
(choice) variable of individual i’s motivation and skills (i.e., “motivated skill”). More 
specifically, we can represent an individual level (arrow 2) production function as a simplified 
                                                          
17  Thus, it is assumed that the routine will always improve output relative to the prisoners’ dilemma output (i.e., 
the minimum output), but will never be able to reach the first-best output level (the level that could be reached if 
information was symmetric).  
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Cobb-Douglas function:   
(1)         Yi  = bo  Xi b1 ri   
where ri represent stochastic factors. In logs, this becomes 
(2)  log Yi  = log bo + b1 log Xi  + log ri   
ri has the usual stochastic interpretation (i.e., normally distributed with mean zero, uniform 
variance, and zero co-variance among the residuals) across the N individuals. bo is the total 
factor productivity of the routine. Again, to avoid notational complexities we have suppressed 
other productive factors (notably capital) which may be regarded as embodied in b0.  
Aggregating Up 
Under standard assumptions about the value (benefits) of Y and the cost of motivated skill (X) 
to each individual, the optimal levels of Yi,   i = 1,2,…, i,.., N, are easily definable in terms of 
equalizing costs and benefits at the margin. Then the total output, Yindep., is given by 
(3)        Yindep = Σi Yi           
where “indep.” stands for independent individual maximisation. Thus, the firm-level outcome 
is reached by simple addition (i.e., arrow 3 in Figure 2). However, the notion of routines imply 
more than equation (3). In order to better capture the meaning and implications of routines, 
assume now that the individual production functions potentially take the form 
(4)         Yi *  = b0 (Xi  Σk aik Xk )b1 ei , 
where ei  represent stochastic factors. In logs, this becomes 
(5)        log Yi *  = log b0 + b1 log X i  + b1 log Σk (aik Xk ) + log ei 
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k = 1, 2,…….…., N; k ≠ i. ei has the usual stochastic interpretation across the N individuals. 
aik is the weighting of the external effect of individual k’s motivated skill (Xk) upon individual 
i’s output performance (i.e., “Hawthorne effects”). In other words, aik represents externalities 
in production. These may be negative as well as positive. In this context, the notion of 
“institutionalization” can be interpreted to refer to the extent to which the effects represented 
by aik can be maintained in the face of turnover; for example, strong institutionalization 
implies that aik is rather invariant to personnel turnover.  
It is convenient to interpret the matrix, A, of binary coefficients aik across the N actors as a 
network, or more formally, a di-graph, R = (N; A), where N represent the nodes and A the 
arcs. In fact, given our earlier remarks about the institutionalised capacity of organisation 
routines it may be useful to regard the graph R as running across institutionalised positions 
rather than specific individuals. This conceptualization links capability and routines: The more 
an organization has institutionalised such positions, the better its capability of repeatedly 
realising the routine. 
The significance of A is that it marks the potential for collective action in the following sense: 
To the degree each individual, k, sets her level of motivated skill at Xk, taking account of, not 
only her own output Yk, but also the impact she has on the other individuals in R, the value of  
(6)               Ydep = ΣiYi* 
 will be optimal. In general,  
   (7)           Ydep >  Yindep 
if, for at least one pair i and k, ai k > 0, and individuals take account of their impact on other 
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individuals in R.  
Production in Routines 
If, as before, we assume conventional individual cost functions in X, it is intuitive that the 
individual level production functions (i.e., equation (4)) establish an N-person prisoner’s 
dilemma. Thus, the (Pareto) optimum is achieved when all players internalise their external 
effects in setting their respective X values (Holmström, 1982). Each has, however, an 
incentive to free ride and then Y (indep) will be realised, supporting the (sub-optimal) N 
person Nash equilibrium.18 The firm tries to prevent this problem by institutionalising a 
routine.19  
We now allow both parameters in equations of the form (4) to vary across routines j. Assume, 
without any loss of generalisation, that they take, respectively, the simple linear forms 
(8)  log boj  =   c01 Zj  +  log u0j  
(9)        b1j  =   c11  Rj  + u1j 
where again the u terms are both stochastic with the standard interpretation. Zj and Rj are 
variables which vary across routines, but not across individuals within a routine. These are 
firm-level variables that impact/moderate the relation between individual level motivated skill 
and individual output performance.  Thus, Zj measures the variation in total factor productivity 
across routines (that is, effects in output that are not caused by inputs of motivated skill), while 
Rj is a measure of the extent to which the routine internalizes externalities. By making these 
                                                          
18 This is akin to the familiar team production problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982). 
19 This may be taken as an interpretation of Nelson and Winter’s (1982: 107-112) notion of routines-as-truces. 
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stochastic functions we signal that arrow 1 in Figure 3 is empirical rather than definitional.20  
Introducing variation across j and combining (2) with (8) and (9) we obtain an expression for 
individual i’s productivity in routine j:  
(10)      log Yi j   =  c01 Zj   + c11 Rj  log Xi j + log u0 j  + u1 j  log Xi j + log ri j   
Note the dependence of the “error” on the value of X which in the context of empirical 
estimation would call for special treatment.  
In light of the earlier analysis let, 
(11)       Rj = 1/N(N-1) Σi Σk aikj Xik  
That is to say, Rj is the mean value of the institutionalised external effects in routine j. 
So (10) becomes  
(12)        log Yi j = c01Zj  + c11 ( 1/N(N-1) Σi Σk ai j k Xkj ) log X i j + log u0 j + 
u1j log Xi j + log ri j  
The firm by averaging over the external effects institutionalises the production functions 
across routines:    
(13)          Yi j = Zj c01 (  Xi j  ) c11 ( 1/N(N-1)  Σi Σk aikj Xkj )  u0j ri j Xi j u i j 
 With an averaging assumption the total output will be Y (mean) for any j, where    
(14)          Y*dep. > Ymean > Yindep.    
                                                          
20 We here deviate slightly from the Coleman diagram; Rj impacts the coefficient relating the micro level 
variables X and Y  rather than the value of X itself, which appears to be Coleman’s intention. This is captured in 
Figure 3 where the arrow 2 is drawn as incident into arrow 3 rather than into X. It does seem sensible to allow 
macro variables to modify the impact of micro motivational variables. 
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Notice that the collective/macro level variables, Zj and Rj, enter the explanation of the 
routines-performance link, not through arrow 4 in Figure 2, but by moderating the relationship 
between the exogenous individual level variable and performance (c11; arrow 2), or directly by 
influencing Yij (i.e., c01 Zj; arrow 1a).   
Collectivist Explanation is Incomplete  
Armed with the above analysis, we can now examine somewhat more rigorously the claim 
made earlier that collectivist explanations are, in the present context, not tenable. Specifically, 
we can ask whether it would it ever prove sensible to explain the capabilities-performance link 
only in terms of arrow (4).   
Assume (2), introducing variation across j, is changed to 
(15)  log Yi j = log bo j + log ri j .     
This is equivalent to saying that all the individual level exogenous variables, embodied in rij, 
bear a random relationship to individual performance. This is of course highly unlikely, but 
this is the only meaning we can attach to the idea whereby arrow 4 can constitute a sui generis 
form of explanation (Abell, 2003b). 
Given this change, (10) also undergoes change, namely to 
 (16)              log Yi j =  c01 Zj + log ri j + log μ0 j 
But (16) is depicted as arrow 1a in Figure 2.  Given (6), arrow 4 in Figure 2 is a transitive 
closure of arrows 1a and 3.   
Thus, the above demonstrates that we can use collective level, arrow 4 explanations at best as 
shorthand or “reduced form” explanation. Arrow 4 must always be either a conjunction of 
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mechanisms indicated by arrows 1, 2 and 3 or/and arrows 1a and 3. Thus, in explaining 
collective level phenomena, reference must be made to the level of the individual. A further 
interpretation is that individual-level/”micro” explanation replaces collective-level/”macro” 
explanation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The field of strategic management seems to be increasingly aware of the need to embark upon 
a micro-foundations project. Scholars increasingly strive to build individual-level foundations 
for firm-level phenomena, such as heterogeneity and superior financial performance. 
However, the perhaps dominant approach to firm-level heterogeneity in strategic management, 
the capabilities view, has seen virtually no attempts to build explicit micro-foundations. As a 
result, it is unclear how central collective-level constructs in this view, such as routines and 
capabilities, emerge from individual action and interaction, and it is unclear how they impact 
firm-level outcomes. Indeed, most of the capabilities view argues solely on the collective 
level.  
The main argument in this paper has been that this is a methodologically unsound approach, 
and that micro-foundations must be built. It has been demonstrated that collectivist 
explanation is incomplete in strategic management, and a simple formal model has been 
offered as an example of how micro-foundations may be built. Some implications of the 
model are that routines may be meaningfully interpreted within a standard production function 
framework (in contrast, Nelson and Winter [1982] are strongly critical of this framework), and 
that ideas from the economic theory of the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 
1982) may have a significant bearing on the understanding of the nature of routines.  
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Although our reasoning is based on familiar and basic ideas (mainly from economics), it is 
consistent with a broad set of behaviours. In particular, the arguments and modelling effort in 
this paper are not tied to rational choice theory per se; learning and adaptive behaviours are 
entirely consistent with the model. Future research may usefully be applied to more explicit 
modelling of individual action and interaction. It may be that analytical models may not be 
adequate for this task.  For example, modelling of the emergence of routines in a firm with 
bounded rational, but learning agents may require that simulation methods are adopted (as in 
Marengo, 1996; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Gavetti, 2005). The same may be the case for 
modelling the impact of routines on performance, given bounded rational, learning agents.  
Our aim with this paper has been to make a fundamental methodological point, that 
collectivist explanation is fundamentally incomplete, and to indicate that the project of 
building micro-foundations for routines and capabilities is a viable one. Many theoretical and 
modelling approaches are consistent with this overall message. A broader aim is to provide 
guidelines for scholars to think about the underlying assumptions that their theories make, 
specifically with an eye toward making links between micro and macro levels. Our arguments 
certainly do not exhaust the full spectrum of the types of considerations that are made in any 
research project, but at least begin the process of pushing scholars toward directions 
articulated in this paper.  
In sum, we hope that our arguments may help to counteract what we see as a disappearing 
mandate for strategic management. What we mean by this is that the possibility of strategic 
action (and thus management) may become obscured by a  too strong emphasis on firm-level 
constructs, such as routines and capabilities. It would seem critical to management scholars to 
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understand and be able to impute actions to individuals, rather than collective variables. We 
have tried to explain why this is so, and to sketch some ways forward that we hope will be 
inspiring to others.  
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Figure 1: A General Model of Social Science Explanation
1
2
3
4
Individual
action
Conditions
of individual
action
Social 
outcomes
”Social 
facts” (e.g., 
institutions)
”macro”
”micro”
 
 
 35
Figure 2: Explaining Routines and 
Explaining By Means of Routines
• •
••
•
•
•
Macro antece-
dents for routines Routines
Firm-level
outcomes
1                                                               3    1a                                                         3a  
2 2a
Not described and 
clarified in extant
literature on routines
Not described and 
clarified in extant
literature on routines
4                                                               4a
 
 
 
 
 36
• •
• •
Figure 3: Explaining the Routines/Performance Link
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